Talk:Battle of Chosin Reservoir

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Good articleBattle of Chosin Reservoir has been listed as one of the Warfare good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
February 12, 2010Good article nomineeListed
On this day...Facts from this article were featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "On this day..." column on November 26, 2004, November 26, 2005, November 26, 2006, November 26, 2007, November 26, 2008, November 26, 2011, November 26, 2013, and November 27, 2023.

China won this battle[edit]

There is no debate. The U.S. retreated. It's that simple.

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 157.182.191.188 (talk) 16:44, 13 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Map and Location References in Battle Section[edit]

Okay either the map is wrong or the write up is wrong. 31RCT was on the east side of the reservoir, strung out from Hudong to the north. Yet the section makes several references to them being in sinhung. Other maps reference sinhung in the same place, and in many readings about this battle I have never heard of any 31RCT elements on the west side of the reservoir. The article also contains several conflicting, (indeed physically impossible) statements such as being north of hudong yet south of sinhung. It also says hill 1221 commands the road between those two towns and yet it is clearly north of hudong. I am going to make some changes to clear this up over the next few days as anyone reading this section would probably become quickly confused. Outcast95 (talk) 06:02, 19 November 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I doubt there are any "other maps" outside of copies of the US Army official maps currently displayed on this page, but please read footnote e and Appleman page 32 before jumping to conclusions. There are two towns named Sinhung-ni in the Chosin area. One of them is on the east side of the lake north of Hudong, with Hill 1221 standing between them. Another one is on the south-west side of the lake and south of Yudami and north of Hagaru. RCT 31 was holed up in the first town, while the second town played no notable role in battle (which is why I avoided to mention the second town in this article to avoid this confusion in the first place). Unfortunately, the US Army public domain map is not detail enough to make the distinction, and it is the only map avilable that is not under copyright protection. Jim101 (talk) 14:27, 19 November 2013 (UTC)[reply]

There are many places called "Sinhung" in that part of Korea. I think that there's another one north of Hudong that is not shown in the battle map. GiuseppeFichera (talk) 21:51, 6 June 2019 (UTC)[reply]

"Crippling Losses"[edit]

Although Chinese troops managed to surround and outnumber the UN forces, the UN forces broke out of the encirclement while inflicting crippling losses to the Chinese. The evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam marked the complete withdraw of UN troops from North Korea.

There are two problems here: (1) in what sense were the Chinese losses "crippling"? Those losses were a small drop in China's manpower pool. Unless someone can produce evidence to justify this claim -for example by documenting that Chinese losses effected their subsequent operations in Korea- I'm editing this to reflect a NPOV; (2) this sentence goes to great lengths to avoid saying the obvious - that Chosin Reservoir was a DEFEAT for the US / UN. Lexington50 (talk) 20:51, 29 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

1) 40% of all Chinese forces in Korea were knocked out during the battle and were never replaced. (As indicated in the aftermath section)
2) All of them were elite formations. (As indicated in the background and aftermath section)
3) Chinese sources, including official history have described the battle as a massive failure. (Per footnotes from Chinese books)
4) The success of UN Counteroffensive in the spring of 1951 is directly caused by the huge Chinese losses. (Supported by both Chinese and US sources)
5) US X Corps was ordered to withdraw, not because Chinese defeated them. Legitimately it is a UN victory that only turned into a defeat due to situations outside of this battle. By looking at the Chinese casualties numbers, after the first 3 days of battle, most of the Chinese forces were destroyed or starved/frozen to death even before the UN forces were thinking about a break out. Hardly a defeat for UN forces.
And I should caution you not to confuse Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River with this battle, like most of the US published Korean War history books tend to do. I hope this address your concern. Jim101 (talk) 20:59, 29 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Like so many of the American commercially published 'history books' that Jim101 references and the "official" US Marine Corps published history, most of which do not have a NPOV; they are written to glorify the Marine Corps. For instance, is it not written in at least one of the references that this battle was a "Campaign"? Then why is not on the list of Official US Navy Campaigns? Remember that the US Marine Corps is a part of the Department of the Navy within the US Department of Defense and is not entitled to have a separate list of campaigns. Accuracy is always in question and brighter people than I have written many half and total untruths and called it fact. If it is written and verifiable, it must be fact? Meyerj (talk) 11:38, 2 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

A comment on point (3) above. The following link is a Web Page from the Chinese government : "http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/hist/2014-11/18/content_4559054.htm", they really didn't quite describe this battle as a "massive failure". JW19335762743 (talk) 08:01, 16 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Copy Pasta from below:
I cite Professor Xue Yuan of PLA National Defense University in page 59 of his seminar work First Confrontation: Reviews and Reflections on the History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea (ISBN 7504305421):

...The 9th Army casualty exceed 40,000 men, including 30,000 frostbite casualties, plus 1,000 men that were frozen to death. After the battle the entire unit was turned into a "huge hospital", and three months were spent on healing the frostbitten soldiers. This is, in our army's history, the worst lesson on frostbite...

The official Chinese history on the Korean War is Chinese Military Science Academy (2000), History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea (抗美援朝战争史), Volume II, Beijing: Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House, ISBN 7801373901, which I quote page 126:

The PVA 9th Army's combat operation is carried out in harsh conditions. During the battle, snow storm was non-stop and the average temperature was between -27 to -30 degrees Celsius. Soldiers were wearing thin clothing, suffering hunger and cold, lacking proper supplies, some units can only have one frozen meal per every two days, soldier's health was deteriorating rapidly, frostbite casualties was severe. During the battles at Sinhung-ni, the 27th Corps 80th Division 250th Regiment 5th Company was suppressed by enemy firepower, all units were frozen to death due to taking cover on the snow covered grounds. The severe winter weather also affected weapon use, causing 70% weapons not operational, large numbers of rifles and machine guns were frozen and unable to fire, communications were also adversely impacted.

Just because Chinese history claimed that they won the battle against 1st Marine Division does not mean Chinese history also denied that there was a massive failure in preserving 9th Army's strength and the maintaining competent logistic system. Furthermore, People's Daily is the PR department of the CCP, not an academic military history research organization like the Chinese Military Science Academy or the PLA National Defense University. Jim101 (talk) 13:37, 16 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

The web site I cited belongs to the "Ministry Of National Defense Of The People's Republic Of China", not People's Daily. I have no idea why Jim101 mentioned People's Daily. Chinese official viewpoint, in my understanding, be it official propaganda or official history, does not view this battle as a failure, and they have very good reasons. JW19335762743 (talk) 09:05, 24 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

"來源︰人民網 作者︰ 時間︰2014-11-18 15:19:58"...first line of your sources. As I have already stated and translated above, the official Chinese history did goes into detail and describes the massive failure of Chinese logistics and the horrendous casualties suffered by 9th Army, and the impact it had on Chinese operations between January and March 1951, I don't see why people can pretend such POV does not exist from the Chinese government and tell me to look away. Jim101 (talk) 21:03, 24 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

The web page I cited was "http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/hist/2014-11/18/content_4559054.htm", am I talking about the same page with Jim101? I cited one and only one web page. JW19335762743 (talk) 12:31, 2 February 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Unless the author credit is not "來源︰人民網 作者︰ 時間︰2014-11-18 15:19:58" (Source: People's Daily Author: Time: 2014-11-18 15:19:58), of course we are talking about the same page. I don't know what you are ranting about. Jim101 (talk) 21:57, 2 February 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Oh, my bad. : ) Yes, I just noticed this. However, Peolpe's Daily is a very important Communist Party paper, and Chairman Mao emphasized the party control of the military, just like President Truman's control of General MacArthur. I would say a PRC DoD's web site, citing an article from People's Daily web edition, is every bit as official as any Chinese history professor. : ) JW19335762743 (talk) 11:05, 6 February 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Just a little correction for the one who put that article.[edit]

First of all Thank you for writing an article about the Chosen Reservoire Battle (the Forgotten war)...documentation about such war unfortunately are rare. You mention that the UNdeployed to the Chosen were nickname "The chosen Few" actually there are a small conflict on it...The men who died at the chosen were nickname "The Chosen" the very few that survive the battle were nickname the Chosen few. There will be a documentary movie created by a Captain featuring many survivor of the Chosen reservoir airing at the NatGeo this September I believe... I strongly recommand watching it... The title is " THE CHOSEN". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.12.55.129 (talk) 14:49, 14 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Can you provide a source that I can use to correct the mistake? Jim101 (talk) 16:05, 14 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
All the survivors of the of the reservoir, in particular, the 5th and 7th Marines, the 1st Marines lead by Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller, who were fighting to hold open their egress route have taken the title of Chosin Few. There are ligitimate branches of the Chosin Few across America and they all wear the symbol and words "Chosin Few". The 1st Marine Division along with elements of the 7th, 8th Army, the climate and Superior American Air Support from the US Navy, Marines and Air Force inflicted severe damage to the PLA's ability to prosecute this battle. The Marines were the spearhead, I know, my father was with the 7th Marines, however, they had help. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 138.162.0.46 (talkcontribs)

Remembrance[edit]

Would it make sense to add a section at the bottom of the article about rememberence/memorials of this battle in the "forgotten war"? A new memorial in Forest Park, St Louis, MO for the battle was dedicated today. I have a great picture of living members of the "The Chosin Few" gathered around the memorial if that is of interest. Apparently I don't have privlidges to upload to wikipeida - but I'd be happy to e-mail to somebody if they are interested.

As long as you have a reliable news source on the event, you are free to add it yourself. Jim101 (talk) 01:57, 3 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Question, are you talking about the Camp Pendleton memorial? Because that is the only memorial I can find that is backed up by notable news sources. Jim101 (talk) 02:06, 3 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I added the information on Camp Pendleton memorial. Jim101 (talk) 02:31, 3 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Legacy[edit]

The US military recently had a large gathering of veterans to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the battle (source) —Ed!(talk) 06:20, 12 November 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Nice summary on the numbers of MOH awarded during the battle. Jim101 (talk) 07:37, 12 November 2010 (UTC)[reply]

While studying military history for a Wikipedia article on Unit cohesion, I came upon this quote:

  • ... traditional explanations do not adequately answer why the Marines survived as a fighting force and the 31st RCT was defeated in detail. [1]

So what was it that led to the disintegration of the RCT? Was it just the rapid loss of two top commanders, or was there something else? --Uncle Ed (talk) 02:06, 25 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

First of all, Task Force Faith was annihilated as an unit with most of its records/witnesses lost, so there are really no clear answers to this question nor a clear recounts of the actual event (otherwise I would put it there already). By tracing the Task Force Faith breakout effort on December 1, it appears that heavy Chinese fire managed to pin down most of the soldiers, killed a lot of officers in the process, and command and control just broken down from that point. By viewing from the Chinese account of the same engagement, it appears that Chinese thrown 3 whole divisions against Task Force Faith and attack it non-stop from November 27 to December 1, while at the same time completely giving up on 1st Marine Division after the failure of the November 27 attack. Probably the command and control break down PLUS the sheer weight of Chinese number buried the fate of the Task Force. Jim101 (talk) 02:40, 25 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Thomas Ricks says http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=21094 that the reason the Marines were all bunched up on the west side while a pitiful Army group had to be put on the east at the last moment is that OPS refused to divide his own force of Marines. Hcobb (talk) 22:32, 8 June 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Spitballing from experience it would look to be the work of three major crises the marines didn't suffer. 31st RCT was outnumbered way worse than the Marines. They not only lost their two main officers, they were cut off from contact to hudong when the Chinese took hill 1221. They then failed to clear the roadblock at hill 1221 in their retreat, making impossible to maintain any unit cohesion in the rugged terrain of Korea. Anyone that got out, walked (or was carried) around hill 1221. Anyone staying with the vehicles was crushed between hill 1221 and the Chinese forces coming up behind. As to the "pitiful" Army group, we can blame preparation for that one. 31 RCT was not given any time to consolidate their forces much less resupply before being shoved out there. They were actually missing much of the RCT. Had they stopped at hill 1221 and had they had their whole RCT, we might be reading an entirely different story. Also the loss in cohesion happened when they were cut off from each other. What happened at the end was obliteration, the total destruction of the RCT as a unit. Outcast95 (talk) 06:02, 19 November 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Why is it a campaign?[edit]

Jim101, Since you are the current owner of this article, tell me why you have written that this battle of the Chosin Reservoir is also called the Chosin Campaign. Not all military fights are campaigns. The USMC seems to be the only official agency to call it a campaign, yet they have no campaign streamer for it on their colors. Not even their parent organization the Department of the Navy, nor the Department of Defense call it a Campaign. Admittedly some authors have repeated the word from the book of Marine Corps, but repeating a known untruth does not make it correct. Meyerj (talk) 01:12, 23 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

USMC seems to be the only official agency to call it a campaign...this is the problem. Per WP:NPOV and WP:COMMONNAME, USMC viewpoint on this matter must be represented, even if it is somewhat ingenious/fringe. As long as this article's itself is not named as Chosin Campaign, then it is a fair compromise between WP:NPOV and WP:UNDUE. Furthermore, Chinese source also refer to this battle as a "campaign", so USMC naming convention is far from minority. Jim101 (talk) 15:36, 23 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Ok. Meyerj (talk) 18:08, 23 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you to those at the Battle of Chosin[edit]

What most here don't realize is that there were 15,000 US troops, 12,000 suffered minor to severe frostbite, 3,000 died, 6,000 were wounded. It was one of the most brutally fought battles in the history of the US Military due to the bitter cold conditions. The US Forces killed 43,000 chinese, eliminating two entire divisions which were never seen on the field of battle again. They evacuated 98,000 North Korean (unarmed by law) refugee's as the Chinese and North Korean armies pursued the breakout, they slaughtered thousands, of (unarmed by law) civilians in their wake. Over 1 million descendants can be traced back to the 98,000 evacuated into South Korea. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.201.100.46 (talk) 21:27, 9 January 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Chinese Pyrrhic victory[edit]

It appears that people still disputing this even after all the professional Chinese and US sources I cited and crossed referenced, so I'll outline my cases more clearly:

1) I cite Professor Xue Yuan of PLA National Defense University in page 59 of his seminar work First Confrontation: Reviews and Reflections on the History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea:

...The 9th Army casualty exceed 40,000 men, including 30,000 frostbite casualties, plus 1,000 men that were frozen to death. After the battle the entire unit was turned into a "huge hospital", and three months were spent on healing the frostbitten soldiers. This is, in our army's history, the worst lesson on frostbite...

2) The official Chinese history (History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea, Volume II by PLA Military Science Academy) stated that 9th Army accounted for 40% of all Chinese combat forces in Korea until March 1951, and between Jan. to Feb. 1951 the UN forces expelled Chinese forces from South Korea partly due to lack of reinforcement on the Chinese side (this connection was explicitly stated by Patrick Roe in his book The Dragon Strike).

3) No Chinese history ever stated that they destroyed 1st Marine Division or the 7th Infantry Division, the main objectives for the battle as stated in page 113 of official Chinese history. The closest I could find to such claim was on page 126 of official Chinese history, which claims of "near annihilation" of 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division. Allan R. Millett, in his book The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came From the North stated on page 356 that the word "annihilation" (歼灭) is a buzzword favored by Chinese media.

4) The complete expulsion of UN forces from Chosin was the direct result of Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, not this battle. This fact was confirmed in official US Army history Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War in Chapter VIII.

Unless someone can come up with counter arguments that the Chinese somehow gained benefits directly from the Chosin battle that outweighs the above points, I would argue that technically Chinese did not achieve a "Decisive Tactical Victory", and "Chinese Pyrrhic victory" is technically the most accurate description to the outcome of this battle. Jim101 (talk) 17:18, 9 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I would completely agree. The long-term impact of this battle on the units involved says a great deal; the Marine division took several months to recover, but the much larger Chinese 9th Army took substantially longer, and the formations did not return to the previous level of battle readiness. The long term effect of this battle is significant to take into account. —Ed!(talk) 18:23, 9 June 2013 (UTC)[reply]

I don't see how this can be termed a Pyrrhic victory. The Chinese and North Korean forces drove the UN forces out of North Korea within two months. What's so "pyrrhic" about that?? You can say that the Chinese were successful "at great cost" or something along those lines, if you want but to call it "pyrrhic" is very misleading, in my view, and I have deleted the sentence.Star-lists (talk) 02:33, 31 October 2016 (U:TC)

Given that "the Chinese and North Korean forces drove the UN forces out of North Korea within two months" in a completely different battle on the other side of Korea, while losing 40% of their total forces in this battle, I think my original cases is still stands. Jim101 (talk) 16:13, 27 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Forces[edit]

It should be noted that the Chinese 9th Army Group was one of the most experienced force in the entire Chinese Army and unlike what the article states it was at full strength. The actual enemy strength may have been 67,000 at the start of the battle but it grew to over 120,000 during the course of the battle. Most Chinese sources admit that the casualties suffered by the 9th Army were heavy. The numbers quoted are around 40,000. The article further states that the 9th Army took 40% losses. 40,000 out of 67,000 is closer to 70%. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Palermoga (talkcontribs) 16:37, 27 November 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Aside from the fact that 9th Army was an elite formation (which is stated in the Forces and strategies section), the rest of the analysis is incorrect (unless you can provide sources to counter my below points). The Chinese initially committed six divisions, not ten divisions as you inferred. It only grew to ten divisions after the Chinese 26th Corps arrived in December. Also, the Chinese 26th Corps was never fully committed, since the Chinese 78th and 88th Division never arrived at Chosin because they were too stationed too far way due to the food shortage. Furthermore, Chinese prisoner interrogation by US X Corps confirmed that Chinese forces were suffering hundreds, if not thousands of cold casualties per day between November 10th to 27th. Finally, the article only states that Chinese 9th Army accounted for 40% (12 out of 30 Divisions) of all Chinese forces in Korea and were put out of action by the end of battle...the Chinese 13th Army accounted for the other 60% at Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. I do concede to the point that ten understrength Chinese divisions could number somewhere between 70,000 to 90,000 (I do hear the number 80,000 get thrown around a lot when broaching the matter with Chinese sources, but so far unable to trace the source of that number), but again due to WP:RS, the number 67,000 is the best scholarly analysis I can come up with given the above constraints. Jim101 (talk) 23:06, 27 November 2013 (UTC)[reply]

are there unurgent orders?[edit]

"Under Mao's urgent orders"

"Chosin" is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean name, "Changjin".

The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.

You want to put the first sentence in the intro?66.234.58.131 (talk) 18:54, 17 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

"The Marine night fighters" - which division are these guys in - "Marine night fighters" - please rephrase 66.234.58.131 (talk) 19:03, 17 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

This is totally illegal "finally start" - change to "felt they could" or "started" — Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.234.58.131 (talk) 19:09, 17 April 2016 (UTC) [reply]

"It was not long before the PVA 173rd" On the day/night of the PVA 173rd - not long before is a "nogo" - On either the day of blah or night of blah blah - I don't know what 'long before' is 66.234.58.131 (talk) 19:17, 17 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

Change "initial estimate" to predicted Change "normally assumed" to estimated Or some fashion or the other of your choosing

or instead of predicted which is already used - how about "expected", anticipated, etc 66.234.58.131 (talk) 19:23, 17 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

...and normally predicted/assumed/anticipated by Who? 66.234.58.131 (talk) 19:26, 17 April 2016 (UTC)[reply]

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Mao as a commander[edit]

Crediting Mao as a commander here is inaccurate. While it's true he was the leader of the PRC during this time, he was not in military command. Unless Harry Truman is listed as the first American commander here then it's inaccurate. The equivalent of Douglas MacArthur in this battle was Peng Dehuai--Wordbearer88 (talk) 04:57, 3 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Unlike Truman, Mao did micromanaged both Peng and Song Shilin during the battle. Jim101 (talk) 16:27, 27 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

NPOV[edit]

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was part of a shambolic retreat, but this article tries to portray it as some kind of triumph.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:21, 15 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

There are three sources cited for the claim in the infobox that it was a "tactical victory" for the UN (US):
  • Quigley (not a professional historian) describes it as "an epic, born out of disaster, in a series of brilliant, hardfought tactical victories, while at the same time for the Army's Tenth Corps and Macarthur's HQ in Tokyo, it was a crushing strategic defeat" (the Foreword).
  • Edwards, discussing the perception of the battle, asks, "How has this event become a tactical victory for the Marines and a disgraceful loss for the army that was fighting next to them?" (p 67). Elsewhere he says that the retreat was a "masterpiece of military stupidity and unpreparedness that has somehow become tragically heroic" (p 64), the "greatest defeat and rout of military forces in American history" (p 65). Citing this source is cherrypicking in the extreme.
  • Cowley - I cannot access it via Google Books.
Looking at other sources:
  • Bruce Cumings, one of the leading American historians of Korea, describes it as a "terrible defeat" (Korea's Place in the Sun, p 280).
  • The National Museum of the US Army describes it as a "nightmare".
  • Roy Appleman, American military historian, says, "Its hallmarks were misery, soul-crushing cold, privation, exhaustion, heroism, sacrifice, leadership of high merit at times, but finally, unit and individual disaster... It would be hard to find a more nearly hopeless or more tragic story in American military history" [2].
I accept that (a) the US soldiers fought well (at times), (b) they inflicted heavy losses on the other side (perhaps), (c) they frustrated some of the strategic goals of the other side (perhaps), and (d) some of them managed to retreat to South Korea. But these things are true in many defeats. They don't stop this being a defeat for the US. This shouldn't be a jingoistic American propaganda piece. This is supposed to be an encyclopedia with a policy of neutrality.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:44, 17 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]
There doesn't seem to be a source which says it was a "UN tactical victory" and a "Chinese strategic victory", so the infobox shouldn't say this. This is just a synthesis of different comments. And, clearly, it doesn't represent a consensus of the sources. It's also a contradiction to say this and also to say in the lead that it was a "decisive battle".--Jack Upland (talk) 19:45, 17 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]
G'day, Jack, thank you for sharing your thoughts. I think that the two main editors who worked on this article are no longer very active, but will ping them anyway in the hope that maybe they can address your concerns. @Ed! and Jim101: Failing that, if there are no responses, the best solution may be for you to boldly make changes you are proposing and then see what others think. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 02:23, 23 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, AustralianRupert. I made a few changes yesterday. I thought it was better to raise the issue on the Talk page first.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:06, 23 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I have removed the NPOV tag because I have made the relevant changes to the infobox and the lead, and there appears to be no dispute.--Jack Upland (talk) 10:34, 24 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for your changes! And indeed your concerns. There's a frustration with Korean War history that North Korean and Chinese sources tend to be unreliable, and so the western historians tend to rely on the US Army's own research on the events. I think you've set it on a good path. —Ed!(talk) 00:12, 25 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Most of my reasoning on how to described the victory condition has been described in the section Talk:Battle_of_Chosin_Reservoir#Chinese_Pyrrhic_victory. In summary, my thoughts are:

  • Is it a strategic victory for the Chinese? IMO it is not per citation 1, if the one of the main result of this battle is Chinese got defeated and chased out of South Korea after Jan 1951.
  • Is it a operational/tactical victory for the Chinese? IMO it is a bit half and half...to play devil's advocate, does it count as a win if your entire army turned into a "field hospital" for three months and the enemy only yield ground due to situations on the other side of Korean peninsula?
  • if it is not a clear cut strategic or tactical win for the Chinese side, then what is this victory should be called?

Although I do agree with one point with Jack Upland, I definitely think it is grossly inaccurate to describe this battle as some kind of "UN victory". Jim101 (talk) 15:42, 27 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

1) You'll want to lay off the histrionics. Describing it as a "shambolic retreat" when the infobox says that "40% of Chinese combat forces in Korea disabled until March 1951" and calling for neutrality when you described the prior version of the article as a "jingoistic American propaganda piece" doesn't prove anything except the fact that you don't know what the hell you are even writing about.
2) I concur with your recommendation to leave that part of the infobox out. Alternatively we can go with what Jim101 wrote here (which is to describe the result of the battle as "Disputed") but FTR I think that it's one of those rare cases where it's better to not mention the result so as to keep the wording as neutral as possible and just let the reader decide. Some of the sources describe the outcome of the battle specifically as a "UN tactical victory" or "Chinese strategic victory" but like you said they don't represent the consensus position on the issue. Either way calling it just a "Chinese victory" (or some form of that) is a complete misrepresentation of what happened during the battle.
3a) Quigley's quote supports my description of the battle as tactical victory for the UN and strategic victory for the Chinese.
3b) Same with Edwards
3c) That's what Cowley says
3d) Can't comment on Cummings as I can't access it
3e) The portrayal of the actions of the involved unit by the US Army source is consistent with my description of the battle as a tactical victory for the UN. ("Many historians now agree that Task Force MacLean blocked the Chinese drive along the eastern side of Chosin for five days and allowed the Marines along the west side to withdraw into Hagaru-ri. Furthermore, the task force destroyed the CCF 80th Division. In recognition of their bravery, Task Force MacLean/Faith was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation in September 1999.")
3f) The article that quotes Applebaum portrays the actions of the involved unit in a way that is consistent with my description of the battle as a tactical victory for the UN. ("But a number of historians and some Marine veterans of Chosin now believe that the 1st Marine Division might have been destroyed had the poorly armed, ill-trained soldiers of Task Force Faith not bought time by keeping the Chinese from sweeping south. Chinese papers reviewed in recent years by military scholars have shown that the Army task force fought a significantly larger enemy force than commonly understood.")
Wingwraith (talk) 07:15, 12 May 2018 (UTC)[reply]
So, we all agree that it shouldn't be called a "UN victory"?--Jack Upland (talk) 08:17, 12 May 2018 (UTC)[reply]
No we all agree that that part of the infobox should be left out. You would have known that if you (cared to) read what I and you wrote. Wingwraith (talk) 08:41, 12 May 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Sugar-coating results of the battle[edit]

The info box, in my opinion, is misleading about the results of the battle. The battle was a Chinese victory, pure and simple, and it should so be stated. At present that fact is disguised by talking about a "failed Chinese encirclement of UN forces and successful withdrawal" and "disabling 40% of Chinese forces." The Chinese achieved their objective -- and that's a victory. So, I propose that the info box say "Chinese victory" and the other results can be listed after that. Smallchief (talk) 16:55, 1 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I object to your statement that "The battle was a Chinese victory, pure and simple" per evidences I provided at Talk:Battle_of_Chosin_Reservoir#Chinese_Pyrrhic_victory. I have now reverted the summery to revision https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Chosin_Reservoir&oldid=838758364 since it is better sourced and reflects most of the POVs on the matter. Jim101 (talk) 18:02, 6 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Chosin reservoir was about as decisive a victory for China as a battle can be. Not only did the Chinese force the UN forces into a lengthy and costly retreat, it caused all UN forces to be evacuated from northeastern Korea, contributing mightily to a UN withdrawal from all of North Korea. The definition of victory is achieving your objectives. The Chinese achieved their objective. They drove the UN forces out of North Korea.
Would you call the Battle of Gettysburg indecisive or inconclusive? The North suffered heavy casualties at Gettysburg and the South was able to carry out a successful withdrawal. Similarly, at Chosin, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties and the US and UN were able to carry out a successful withdrawal. But I don't think you'll find many who believe that Gettysburg was indecisive or inconclusive. Nor was Chosin. It changed the course of the Korean war, just as Gettysburg changed the course of the Civil War. Smallchief (talk) 01:11, 7 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I disagree with calling it a pyrrhic victory. Who says this apart from Jim? According to the Oxford Dictionary, a pyrrhic victory is "won at too great a cost to have been worthwhile for the victor". This battle was costly, but was still worthwhile in that it drove the US from North Korea.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:57, 7 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The main point is that 1) "The complete expulsion of UN forces from Chosin was the direct result of Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, not this battle. This fact was confirmed in official US Army history Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951, United States Army in the Korean War in Chapter VIII" and 2) "The official Chinese history (History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea, Volume II by PLA Military Science Academy) stated that 9th Army accounted for 40% of all Chinese combat forces in Korea until March 1951, and between Jan. to Feb. 1951 the UN forces expelled Chinese forces from South Korea partly due to lack of reinforcement on the Chinese side (this connection was explicitly stated by Patrick Roe in his book The Dragon Strike)". Unless you can provide evidence that Chinese Korean War aim is deliberately lose 40% of their combat forces in Korea with no measurable gain and got expelled out of South Korea in 1951 for giggles, I am pretty sure the statement "still worthwhile in that it drove the US from North Korea" is purely your personal opinion. Jim101 (talk) 11:58, 7 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Do you have a source which says it is a pyrrhic victory?--Jack Upland (talk) 20:29, 7 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I definitely have a source that state it is disputed, so I don't know what you getting at with this line of questioning. Jim101 (talk) 20:53, 7 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think the article should describe it as a pyrrhic victory if there is no source that says that.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:36, 8 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I agree that with Jack Upland that if reliable sources don't describe Chosin as a "pyrrhic victory" for the Chinese, it shouldn't be described that way on Wikipedia. (I'm not sure that I would regard all U.S. Marine Corps sources as "reliable." There's a lot of bravado and little fact in the "we're attacking in a different direction" rhetoric.)

Secondly, battles have a beginning and an end. At the end of the Chosin battle the Chinese were clearly the winners. To claim, as you did, that it was a "pyrrhic victory" because months later the Chinese last ground in South Korea is sort of like saying that the result of the Battle of the Little Bighorn is "disputed" or that the Indians only won a "pyrrhic victory" over Custer because within a short time the Indians lost the war. Don't confuse battles with wars.

Thirdly, the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River happened at the same time as the Chosin battle. It doesn't seem reasonable to say that Ch'ongch'on was a "decisive Chinese victory" (as the wikipedia article does) while describing Chosin's result as "disputed" or "pyrrhic Chinese victory."

I suspect special pleading here. Chosin was primarily a battle fought by the Marine Corps; Ch'ongch'on was primarily fought by the US army. Is there a biased and non-neutral point of view in stating that Ch'ongch'on was a "decisive Chinese victory" while saying the result of Chosin is "disputed" or only a "pyrrhic victory" by the Chinese? The results of the two battles are as similar as peas in a pod -- the retreat of UN forces and their withdrawal from North Korea. Smallchief (talk) 14:37, 11 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

As a lagniappe, we might also cite Churchill on Dunkirk, "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory." Chosin and Ch'ongch'on were the Dunkirks of the Korean War, except that Dunkirk was more successful, at least in terms of avoiding casualties.Smallchief (talk)
I find it somewhat concerning that while we are trying to build a consensus by sticking to the exact wording provided by the source, you immediately flip over the discussion table and stick your own personal opinion in the summery box. I am pretty sure Official US Army historian Appleman PLUS the Official US Army history PLUS Official Chinese history on the matter should take precedence here over personal opinion here. Jim101 (talk) 00:12, 12 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The further breakdown your points:
1) I won't comment on the first point since this is getting close to WP:RIGHTGREATWRONGS territory here.
2) I am pretty sure the statement I cited from Appleman 1990, p. 355-356 ("Each can claim victory in a certain sense") is equivalent to a disputed result, unless I am losing my grasp of English here. Furthermore, I recall the Indians did not capture the ground in the Battle of the Little Bighorn by losing their entire army while allowing Custer's man to survive with all their equipment intact.
3) I don't even know where to start with this argument other than trying to shake my head against a clear case of "I think, therefore I am". I will let the statements from official US Army history speak for themselves "Almond believed that he could hold Hungnam indefinitely and wanted to stay there out of certainty that by doing so he could divert substantial Chinese strength from the Eighth Army front. Walker, on the other hand, believed the preservation of the Eighth Army required a deep withdrawal. Walker attempted to forestall any order to defend Seoul, insisting that tying his forces to the ROK capital would only allow the Chinese to encircle the Eighth Army and force a slow, costly evacuation through Inch'on. He favored pulling back to Pusan, where once before he had broken an enemy offensive and where now, if reinforced by the X Corps, the Eighth Army might hold out indefinitely.25 MacArthur's G-3, General Wright, meanwhile recommended Pusan as the best beachhead for both the Eighth Army and X Corps on grounds that should UNC forces be compelled to leave Korea, they should leave the distinct impression of having delayed the enemy as long and as well as possible. Wright also pointed out that defending successive lines into the southeastern tip of the peninsula would afford UNC air forces the greatest opportunity to hurt the Chinese; further, if a withdrawal from Korea became necessary during the remaining winter months, MacArthur's command could escape extreme weather conditions at Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time could be effected faster through the Pusan facilities than through any other port. To permit the longest delaying action possible and to enable an evacuation from the best port, Wright recommended that the X Corps be sea lifted from Hungnam as soon as possible and landed in southeastern Korea, that the X Corps then join the Eighth Army and pass to Walker's command, and thereafter that the U.N. Command withdraw through successive positions, if necessary to the Pusan area.26 On 7 December in Tokyo, Generals MacArthur, Collins, and Stratemeyer, Admirals Joy and Struble, and Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, the commander of all Marine forces in the Pacific, considered the various views generated during the week past and agreed on plans that embodied in largest part the recommendations of General Wright."
4) Given all the source I have cited are either taken directly from US ARMY sources or cross referenced with Chinese sources on the matter, I don't even get where the accusation of bias is coming from.
5) If we are doing quotation from famous people, then I don't see why the following quotation was removed in the first place to make your point: "General MacArthur agreed that this was the decisive battle. In commenting on a study by the Marine Corps Board, he wrote: "The Marine Corps Board of Study rightfully points out that the campaign of the 1st Marine Division with attached Army elements in North Korea was 'largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom.'..." Jim101 (talk) 00:41, 12 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The battle certainly isn't disputed therefore it should either say See Aftermath or a Chinese victory. There is no source that states it was a 'pyrrihic victory' either & the outcome certainly wasn't in favour of the UN despite the withdrawal and the casualties they inflicted.Eastfarthingan (talk) 11:52, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I agree.--Jack Upland (talk) 13:05, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I find the mental gymnastics being performed in this thread is amazing...how can the result not in disputed even after evidence presented here state that it is not in both US AND Chinese favor? Do we even care about doing research here or make believes rule the day? Jim101 (talk) 13:18, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The UN and US forces retreated and withdrew from North Korea. That's a Chinese victory. Period. The non-neutral point of view of Jim is illustrated by the Wikipedia Article Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. The two battles were fought simultaneously and had identical results: retreat and withdrawal from North Korea of US and UN forces. Yet, Ch'onch'on is described as a "Decisive Chinese victory" in the wikipedia article. But Jim chooses to make of Chosin something different than a defeat. The consensus of this discussion regarding the Battle of Chosin Reservoir is "Chinese Victory" and the article should be changed to reflect that. One biased editor should not be allowed to hijack an important article. Smallchief (talk) 13:41, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
You provides no research or citations in your arguments above, period. You personally attacked me in your statement above, period. If you bother to read the NPOV thread above your suger coating thread, you should have realize that the consensus on the victory conditionis still not set, period. If you believe all the above combined will somehow change my mind to see your point of view, it won’t happen, period. Jim101 (talk) 14:12, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
No, I don't think it will change your mind. And, by the way, I'm sorry if I hurt your feelings, but I don't think that saying you're biased is a personal attack. I don't recall you've cited any sources for your opinion that it was a "pyrrhic victory" by the Chinese. Smallchief (talk) 14:35, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps somebody here can consult to Chinese language Wikipedia article of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. If the Chinese say the it was a "pyrrhic victory" for them or a "disputed' result, I will cheerfully withdraw my objection to your opinion about the outcome of the battle. But I'm pretty sure the Chinese regard this battle as a decisive victory for China. As they should.
There's been a lot of verbiage over the years, especially from the Marine Corps, to describe this battle as other than a defeat. "It was a fighting withdrawal not a retreat, we were attacking in reverse," etc. The facts are simple: the US forces were forced to retreat from their advanced positions and they did so with courage and skill although they suffered heavy casualties. Moreover, rather than establishing defensive positions or counterattacking to regain lost ground, the battle caused the US to withdraw all its forces from northeastern Korea. Smallchief (talk) 15:12, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
If WP:CW is the only way to resolve this, the there is nothing more I can contribute to this discussion. If consulting a Wiki that can spin the complete destruction of Chinese 180th division in June 1951 as Chinese victory as the correct consensus when editing articles as the correct rule of thumb for this article, then knock yourself out. Jim101 (talk) 15:35, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
You make much of the fact that Chinese casualties at Chosin had an impact in their combat capability in 1951. The same is true for the U.S. units in this battle. To my knowledge, the US Marine units in the Chosin Battle were sidelined until about April 1951.
The Chinese defeat in June 1951 was the result of overconfidence and overextension -- the same factors that led to the U.S. defeat at Chosin in Nov-Dec 1950.Smallchief (talk) 16:03, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
It was not the Americans that got defeated at the battle of chipyong-ni due to lack of manpower, and it was not Truman that mobilized the Chinese 3rd and 19th Army group to plug the Chinese front. That is the main difference. Jim101 (talk) 16:46, 22 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
No the consensus is to leave the outcome part of the infobox out you would have known that if you cared to read the immediately preceding section. Not even the editor who agrees with your position (Jack Upland) would agree with these ([3] and [4]) edits of yours. It doesn't matter if you personally thought that it was a Chinese victory just like how it doesn't matter that I personally think that the PVA got the shit kicked out of them. Like Jim101 said provide research or citations for your arguments and we'll discuss them here. If you can't do that, then stop editing this article. Wingwraith (talk) 01:41, 24 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Yeah, sure. The PLA so thoroughly had its ass kicked that the US forces retreated 50 miles and were evacuated from North Korea. Battles are fought for the purpose of gaining objectives; the PLA gained its objective: to expel US forces from North Korea. Smallchief (talk) 10:58, 24 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Should we have an RfC?--Jack Upland (talk) 08:29, 24 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
This appears to be going nowhere so I would agree on that. Eastfarthingan (talk) 09:30, 24 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Just want to point out that the infobox is part of the lead and, per MOS:LEAD, should summarise the important points of the main narrative. As this article currently stands, the main narrative says only that it was a Chinese victory, sourcing the assertion to Malkasian, p. 91, so really that's the only result that can be legitimately represented in the infobox. I would suggest that step 1 in resolving this issue is to expand the narrative in the Aftermath section to discuss what the RS say about which side won. This would, in theory at least, clarify how the result should be correctly represented in the infobox. Factotem (talk) 10:12, 24 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I think that's a good idea -- and I'll work on it in the coming days. It will be an interesting project to include info in the aftermath about the different interpretations of the battle and its results.

@Smallchief: No really the PVA (not the PLA) got the fucking shit kicked out of them. Do take a quick look through the article, the UN (not the US) forces broke through the attempted encirclement by the Chinese Communist forces, successfully withdrew from North Korea and disabled 40% of Chinese combat forces in Korea disabled until March 1951. Those are objectives as well which were as significant as the objectives that the PVA met. That's why it makes sense to leave the outcome item from the infobox out: because they at the very least cancel out. Just regurgitating that point about that retreat like it is somehow supposed to define the battle would turn this article into a fascist hit-piece. Wingwraith (talk) 01:38, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

It's a fascist hit-piece if you disagee with it? Are you sure that's what you mean to say? Smallchief (talk) 02:46, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Disagree with what? Wingwraith (talk) 03:20, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

@Jack Upland: We don't need a RFC, you already decided that we don't need the outcome item in the infobox and we already have enough people discussing the issue here anyway. Wingwraith (talk) 01:38, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

@Factotem: "As this article currently stands, the main narrative says only that it was a Chinese victory, sourcing the assertion to Malkasian, p. 91," No the paragraph where that citation occurs paints a narrative where neither side won (i.e. "Despite the losses, the US X Corps preserved much of its strength." and "With the absence of nearly 40 percent of the Chinese forces in Korea in early 1951, the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin ultimately enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.") and we used to have source(s) that said otherwise. Wingwraith (talk) 01:38, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

That information qualifies the scale of the victory rather than determines who the victor was. The fact remains that, according to the article as it currently stands, "Chinese victory" is the only legitimate result that can be presented in the infobox. Factotem (talk) 11:41, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
It is very hard to pinpoint a result especially when you have views like Secretary of State Dean Acheson calling Chosin 'the greatest defeat suffered by American arms since the Civil War battle of Bull Run' - this is from a number of sources. But then you have sources like "Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War" by E A. Cohen who state that the 'retreat from Chosin was a victory' (p 187). Eastfarthingan (talk) 08:15, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
All the more reason to thrash this out in the main narrative. Cohen is asserting victory (on p. 186 according to my GBooks preview) in a specific phase of the battle, i.e. the retreat that marked the final stages. Whether it is appropriate to apply this to the whole battle, especially when he also talks of "costly and humiliating defeats" for the UN on pp. 172 & 174-175, is the type of nuance that should really be discussed in the Aftermath section, based on all the reliable sources. On the subject of nuance, the infobox isn't really designed to accommodate detail at the level currently represented in the article by those bullet points. Per the infobox documentation and MILMOS, the result parameter should only identify which side won, and if there's no consensus on this in the RS, then link to the Aftermath section where the issue is discussed. Factotem (talk) 10:29, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I would agree on the point that there are enough well cited nuances on the battle outcome to warrent the article to be summerized as a Chinese/US victory, “pure and simple” in the info box. Jim101 (talk) 11:07, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Both sides cannot have won. If the result is that ambiguous, then "See Aftermath" would be more appropriate. Factotem (talk) 11:41, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I would suggest the info box state "Chinese victory" and "Successful U.S (or UN) withdrawal.Smallchief (talk) 12:04, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I think that will just encourage more debate about what else we put into an infobox that was not designed to accommodate this kind of nuance. Factotem (talk) 12:49, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with User:Factotem's solution. Jim101 (talk) 13:19, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I would agree with See Aftermath, the reader can determine what kind of outcome can be read from that, with reliable source of course. Eastfarthingan (talk) 19:44, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I concur with this "See Aftermath" solution. I've went ahead and implemented the change, let's not let it get derailed just because a certain user objects to it. Wingwraith (talk) 20:13, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Don't see anything in the Aftermath section that would justify See Aftermath for the result in the infobox. This has obviously been discussed at length here on the TP, which maybe influences perceptions, but the article fairly clearly states that it was a Chinese victory. The heavy casualties they incurred and the fact that the UN forces were able to extricate themselves so skillfully only serves to qualify the victory, not negate it. My comment above about See Aftermath was conditional. If the result was ambiguous enough to justify See Aftermath, then that needs to be brought out in the Aftermath section. Factotem (talk) 20:14, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

If there were enough WP:RS's that state Chinese victory then please make a list of them here, & I'm sure it will be considered. Eastfarthingan (talk) 20:24, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I'm going by what the article says, which is the only criteria that is relevant in determining what goes in the lead. Factotem (talk) 20:34, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Meanwhile, the first sentence says it was a decisive battle. Isn't this a contradiction? Also, I would like to see a summary of what sources say in terms of a brief quotation, so we can look at the consensus of sources. Not long-winded arguments or interpretations, defending the opinions of editors. If most sources say it was a victory for the Chinese and a defeat for the US — then that's what we should say. I attempted to do this at the start of this debate, but it was a sandcastle engulfed by froth.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:20, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
A problem is that there were two simultaneous battles going on in North Korea. The Battle of Ch'ongch'on was a clear disaster for UN and US forces; the Chosin Battle was only a partial disaster as the U.S. X Corps retreated, albeit with heavy casualties, and withdrew successfully from North Korea. Chosin is portrayed by many Americans as a triumph of the Marine Corps --but it was a triumph in much the same way that the evacuation of Dunkirk in WW II was a triumph. Take a look at the aftermath section (more balanced in my opinion, as of this moment) and see what you think in terms of what the outcome of this battle was. Smallchief (talk) 09:03, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Aftermath section changes[edit]

I had a closer look at the Malkasian source and have removed the sentence that was sourced to it on grounds of WP:OR. Page 91 (the specific page referenced) makes no mention of either the Chosin Reservoir or the primary UNC unit (X Corps) that participated in the battle, but the sentence says, "China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following the victory at Chosin," I think the issue is that the author of the sentence conflated the relevant material in the Malkasian book (The catastrophic defeat of the US Eighth Army in November and December 1950 showed that liberating Communist countries could be excessively dangerous.) with what happened at Chosin because both events occurred throughout exactly the same time frame. (November-December 1950) The claim about what happened to the Eighth Army is independent of what happened at Chosin Reservoir and the attempt to run the two together constitutes original research. Wingwraith (talk) 23:54, 25 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I've made the following changes in relation to:

A) this edit:
1) Renamed the title (i.e. Effect on the wider war to Wider effect on the Korean War) to make it more precise.
2) Removed the MacArthur, Truman and US Army military quotes as they all were made during and pertained to just the battle. We need commentary which was made at the very least after the battle in order for it to be able to objectively gauge the wider effects of the battle on Korean War.
3) Added material (particularly material that relates to the PVA).
B) this edit:
1) Renamed the title (i.e. assessment to outcome assessment) to make it more precise.
2) Reorder the position of the type of reaction to preserve neutrality (i.e. starts off with sources that say both sides won instead of a pro-PVA source).
3) Added (particularly the actions of 1st Marine Division) and removed material.

Wingwraith (talk) 03:26, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I can't believe that you took out a whole well-referenced paragraph sourced from scholars of Chinese descent on the Chosin battle. Do we only value "real" American opinions on Wikipedia? Are conclusions and opinions from people with Chinese names forbidden on wikipedia -- unless they bolster your personal opinion?
I've put the paragraph back in -- and I'll be looking at the rest of your additions and subtractions. I remind you that wikipedia articles are supposed to be neutral in tone and content. Smallchief (talk) 07:57, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
1) I've directly reverted the edits that you made from 07:28, 30 June 2018 to 17:44, 30 June 2018‎ back to predominantly this version of the article and will ask (per WP:BRD) that you do not revert my reversion until we can agree on the wording of the edits. If you do revert my reversion, then per WP:BRD again we go back to the state of the article that existed prior to your inclusion of the material (this and this) which started this edit dispute.
2) This edit fails neutrality as you are starting the paragraph off with the pro-PVA perspective and in the process thereby implying that the pro-PVA perspective is more important and the legitimate than the pro-UN perspective. The only way to avert further edit warring on this issue is (as I stated above) to start the section off with sources which say both sides were victorious; I could easily prejudice it the other way and portray the battle as a decisive UN victory. I ask that you not debate this any further as it really is an edit that you can't defend and it just won't get us anywhere .
3) I didn't take out anything with the exception of the Mao quote (for the same reason that I gave above in removing the MacArthur, Truman and US Army military quotes) I just reorganized the material. It had nothing to do with your hysterical insinuation that it was motivated by racism. The Xiaobing source needs to be balanced out (via its positioning and an opposing source) and the Zhang source belongs in the wider effect section.
4) I've removed the country references, you are doing it for deceptive reasons (portraying the Chinese Communist narrative as strong because it is united but the American one as weak because it is divided) and in any case it's a meaningless approach to take because like you said the opinions of some sources which originate from a country doesn't characterize the opinions of all of the sources which originate from that country.
5) This edit fails neutrality. Don't try to weaken the force of the argument by using the word "may" when the arguments in the paragraph assert a causal relationship. We can fight over whether there is a case to be made for author attribution as it pertains to that paragraph, but your use of that weasel word just isn't going to work.
6) This edit of yours demonstrates a false equivalence and I've removed it accordingly. The point isn't whether they were out of action, it's why they were out of action.
7) I've removed the Washington Post source as I've found better sources to support the sentence.
Wingwraith (talk) 23:30, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Dubious statements - troublesome sourcing[edit]

Six refs for the first two sentences in the third para of the "Outcome assessment" section is unnecessary. Furthermore, with the exception of one, which I do not have access to, they are questionable:

  • Bill Quigley was a retired Marine officer who appears to have fought at Chosin before being commissioned, which makes his assertions vulnerable to a conflict of interest. His book, according to the introduction, is "..limited in scope and is centered only on personal recollections...". It is self-confessed "creative non-fiction" which uses a "made up" composite platoon as a vehicle to tie together disparate stories. It is also published by Page Publishing, which requires authors to stump up their own money in order to be published, making it borderline vanity press. Finally, this source is not an analysis of the battle but a simple quote from an article in Newsweek, a magazine written by journalists rather than a scholarly work written by historians.
  • The use of Edwards to describe the battle as a tactical victory is cherry-picking at best. The section "The Victory at Chosin" appears in fact to be debunking a myth of an American victory. On p. 65 he writes of the "...greatest defeat and rout of military forces in American history: the Chinese advance from the Chosin Reservoir". On p. 66 he writes that the battle was "...a massive strategic victory pulled off by the communist leader Song Shi-Lun, who won a serious victory over the Allies under the field command of General Oliver P. Smith" and asserts "Yet, through the miracle of propaganda, political denial, selective memory, and historical adjustment, the retreat has become a moment of heroic history".
  • No access to Cowley, so unable to check.
The Cold War: A Military History is a collection of essays written by different authors and only edited by Cowley. Could you add author to the ref, please? Factotem (talk) 12:12, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
  • Nowhere on p. 4 does Smith describe a victory, tactical or otherwise, or the impact of the Marines' action at Chosin on the outcome of the war. Also, this work appears to have been produced by the Marines, which leaves it vulnerable to accusations of conflict of interest.
  • A book review in the New York Times is not a reliable source.
  • Nowhere on p. 36 does Malkasian describe a victory, tactical or otherwise, or the impact of the Marines' action at Chosin on the outcome of the war.

I've tagged the statement as dubious. Factotem (talk) 09:49, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]

1) I've rewrote the sentence so that it now reads: Sources have characterized them as a successful tactical withdrawal and the division's engagement is now regarded as a defining event in the Corps's history.
"successful tactical withdrawal" is fairly self-explanatory, and I'm not sure we need to link it. If that is necessary, then it should be to the article, not a section, especially when that section begins "A withdrawal may be anticipated...". Not seen anything to suggest that UN forces took up positions at Chosin in anticipation of a withdrawal, quite the opposite in fact. Factotem (talk) 11:38, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
2) I've removed the Quigley quote
3) I've removed the Edwards quote
4) I've removed the Smith quote
5) The book review is a reliable source, NYT is a reliable source, the reviewer (Ronald H. Spector) is a noted authority in the relevant field of military history and the book reviewed was written by also another academic.
A book review, however well-regarded the publication it appears in, is not an appropriate source for anything other than the author's opinion on that book. It does not provide scholarly, peer-reviewed analysis of the issue in question here. As for being a noted authority "in the relevant field", Ronald H. Spector's works focus on naval warfare and the conflicts with Japan and in Vietnam, not the Korean War. Factotem (talk) 11:42, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
6) The Malkasian source portrays the actions of the division in a way that is consistent with the rewritten description.
Seems fair. Factotem (talk) 12:03, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Although I'm surprised you haven't chosen to use Cohen's statement about the retreat from Chosin being a victory on p. 186 in Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. That seems to more directly support the basic point you are making about the withdrawal. Factotem (talk) 12:41, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
7) Added this source which supports the rewritten sentence.
Business Insider is a "...fast-growing business news site...". It should be obvious that this is not an appropriate source on military history. Factotem (talk) 11:44, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
8) Added this source which supports the rewritten sentence.
Whilst I'm sure that PBS broadcasts well-researched, high quality programs, it should be obvious that it is not in itself an authoritative source on military history. The programs it broadcasts, on the other, may well be, and it's worth mentioning that the transcript mentions the word victory three times, only one of which relates to Chosin: "...fundamentally it was a Chinese victory...", attributed to Bruce Cumings. Factotem (talk) 11:47, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
9) I've removed the tag
Wingwraith (talk) 23:31, 30 June 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Six references are excessive. It comes across as an attempt to stack citations to outweigh an opposing view. One RS should be enough. Factotem (talk) 11:40, 1 July 2018 (UTC) Update: I've retagged the second sentence in "Outcome assessment" as dubious on three counts: 1. The concerns detailed above about the sources used; 2. the excessive number of refs, and 3. I don't recall seeing anything in the sources to support the assertion that the battle became a defining moment in Marine Corps history (I have read that somewhere, but it's not in the sources provided). Factotem (talk) 12:02, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Explaing {{cn}} tag[edit]

None of the six sources provided support the assertion that the Marines' actions can be linked to the determination of the outcome of the war, so I've tagged the first sentence in the second para of the "Outcome assessment" section with cite needed. Factotem (talk) 11:37, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

failed verification - outcome as a draw[edit]

The statement "Sources have described the outcome as a draw, characterizing it neither as an American defeat nor a Chinese victory." is sourced to p. 338 of U.S. Marines in the Korean War. That page makes no statement about the outcome of the battle, let alone what "sources" say about the outcome. Factotem (talk) 18:51, 2 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Outcome assessment section re-write[edit]

It's been 2 months since I tagged a number of statements in the "Outcome assessment" section. There's been no attempt to fix them, so I've removed the statements they sourced. I've re-written the whole section. I've recognised the concern about starting that with a balanced view, so have led with Appleman's statement that both sides could claim victory. Everything that was well-sourced in the previous version has been retained. I have added statements sourced from Paul M. Edwards's work published this year, and arranged things in what seems to me to be a fair and logical sequence. I've also added a para about the belated recognition of Task Force MacLean/Faith. I guess we'll see how this flies soon enough. Factotem (talk) 15:10, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]

A good effort on your part, and it's much improved over the previous version. I still have a couple of quibbles. First, I think the whole quote from Allen Millet (footnote 48) is dubious. He says the experience at Chosin persuaded the UN that it could defeat Chinese forces? You retreat 60 or more miles, evacuate North Korea, and are increasingly confident? I don't think so. What Chosin and Chongchun demonstrated to the UN forces was that taking North Korea was beyond the range of possibility, and that holding the line at the North Korean/South Korean border should be the objective. In other words, this battle caused the UN forces to shift from a posture of the over-confident offensive to a posture of worried defensive -- and spring offensives by the Chinese justified their worry.
Secondly, twice mentioned in the outcome assessment is that the Chinese IX army was put out of action for 3 months. I think that only needs to be stated once and it should be immediately followed by the parallel statement that the lst Marine Corp Division was out of action for more than 2 months. The important point is that it wasn't only the Chinese forces who were put out of action. That can be accomplished by moving the last paragraph of the section regarding the Marine Corps being out of action until Feb 21. Both Chinese and Marine units were put out of action for a significant period of time. Smallchief (talk) 17:04, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks. Responding to your first para, I don't believe we can excise Millet's statement from the narrative because he does actually say that the Chosin Reservoir Campaign "...convinced the UNC that allied ground troops could defeat Chinese armies, however numerous.". Are there any sources that say otherwise? The consequences for UN aspirations in North Korea that you then mention are covered in the next section, aren't they? Will try and do something about the point raised in your second para. Factotem (talk) 18:29, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Problem. The last para you refer to about the Marines being out of action until 21 Feb is sourced to "Simmons, 362-365, in Smith, ed.". There's no Smith listed anywhere in the bibliography, and the only Simmons is Edwin H. Simmons, whose book Frozen Chosin is listed in the Further reading section and ends with part 6, which makes it 133 pages long. Factotem (talk) 19:01, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, my mistake in sourcing. The reference is not from Simmons, but from Brown, Lt. Col. Ronald J., Counteroffensive: U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Line, in U.S. Marines in the Korea War, (2007), ed. by Charles R. Smith, History Division, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, pp. 363-365. This reference can also be found at pp. 20-23, http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/usmckorea/PDF_Monographs/KoreanWar.Counteroffensive.pdf.
With regard to Alan Millet's comment in the present text of the article that the Chosin Battle "gave the UN confidence that it could defeat the superior numbers of the Chinese forces," Brown says to the contrary on the first page of his book: "As 1950 came to a close the military situation in Korea was so bleak American policy makers were seriously contemplating the evacuation of U.S forces from that embattled country, and American military leaders had already formulated secret contingency plans to do so." (pg. 1, web version of book). I think that statement in Brown's book on the Marine Corps website is more definitive than what Millet says in a Britannica article. Thus, I would still advocate that the quote from Millet be deleted -- or at least labeled "dubious."
Rereading Brown, I'll also make a couple of what I think are non-controversial changes in the para sourced to Brown. If you disagree you can change them back. Smallchief (talk) 20:10, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Unless you can demonstrate that Millet is not a reliable source, then I'm not sure that he can be dismissed just because he contradicts another, presumably reliable source such as Brown. Both viewpoints would need to be incorporated into the narrative. I'm also not sure about the point that is being implied by the Marines not going into action again until Feb 21. On p. 20, Brown shows that in late January the Marines were 24,000 strong (cf. c.25,000 at Chosin), and Smith convinced Ridgeway that, because the Marine Division was "...larger than any of the Army infantry divisions or ROK divisions at this time...", it should, for supply reasons, be placed on the coast. Towards the end of that page he then writes that, because of setbacks the UN experienced in the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive on Feb 11–12, "...Ridgeway had no choice but to commit what he called 'the most powerful division in Korea'...", and that the division was to be ready to move on Feb 14. The point here is that, although the division might not have been committed into action until Feb 21, it appears to have been battle ready before then. Of course, it might be a similar story for the PVA 9th Army. Both Millet and Cohen only talk about the 9th PVA's appearance, and give no clue, as Brown does about the Marines, as to when it was actually ready. Factotem (talk) 21:09, 19 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I won't belabour the point further but compliment you on improving the article. My personal opinion is that the Chinese--armed with little more than rifles and hand-grenades, lacking air power and heavy artillery, unequipped to fight in cold weather, and indifferently supplied by primitive logistics--fought one hell of a battle. Smallchief (talk) 01:00, 20 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I think that it's too pro-American. Other points of view are treated as an afterthought. For example: "Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought, and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952." This is not neutral, and it represents a self-regarding American point of view, rather than a factual view of the battle.--Jack Upland (talk) 10:01, 20 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Not sure I understand. The paragraph you're referring to is a factual account of the rehabilitation of Task Force MacLean/Faith's reputation long after the battle. It has little to do with the immediate outcome of the battle, and I don't see how it fails to be neutral or represents a self-regarding American point of view. Could you clarify your concern, or maybe provide other examples of points of view being treated as an afterthought? Factotem (talk) 13:47, 20 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The phrase "eventually recognized" is POV. It implies this opinion is correct. In general the section foregrounds pro-American opinions. The two references which suggest the Americans might have won are put first.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:01, 21 September 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Victory or defeat — sources[edit]

As I said above, I think we need to look at what the consensus of sources is. Here is how some sources describe the battle:

  • Max Hastings, The Korean War (ch 8): "But X Corps's battle was lost...The communist army endured privations more dreadful than those of the Americans...But the formations of the People's Liberation Army who inherited the wreckage of Hamhung in the last days of 1950 could at least exult in the certainty of strategic achievement. They had driven the US X Corps headlong out of North Korea.
  • Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun (p 286): "...major forces crossed the Yalu...dealing the Americans their terrible defeat at the Changjin (Japanese name, Chosin) reservoir."
  • Stanley Sandler, The Korean War (p 127): "But even Hungnam was no victory. One is put in mind of Churchill's famous dictum after Dunkirk. 'Wars are not won by evacuations'. The UNC had been severely defeated in North Korea."
  • The National Museum of the US Army: a "nightmare".
  • Roy Appleman: "Its hallmarks were misery, soul-crushing cold, privation, exhaustion, heroism, sacrifice, leadership of high merit at times, but finally, unit and individual disaster... It would be hard to find a more nearly hopeless or more tragic story in American military history" [5].
  • Michael Pembroke, Korea (p 123): "Beijing, however, celebrated...both the Marine and Army units of the United States X Corps had been repulsed. The American-led incursion into North Korea was over."
  • Paul M Edwards, The Mistaken History of the Korean War (pp 65–66): the "greatest defeat and rout of military forces in American history: the Chinese advance from the Chosin Reservoir"... "a massive strategic victory pulled off by the communist leader Song Shi-Lun, who won a serious victory over the Allies under the field command of General Oliver P. Smith"..."Yet, through the miracle of propaganda, political denial, selective memory, and historical adjustment, the retreat has become a moment of heroic history".
  • Carter Malkasian, The Korean War (p 36): "However, the Marines' heroism at Chosin cannot mask the catastrophic results of the Chinese intervention for the UNC. The UNC fell all the way back to the 38th Parallel in the longest retreat in American military history".

I don't think there is any equivocation in sources that this was a victory for the Chinese and a defeat for the US/UN.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:30, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Not even the sources that you are referring to establish the consensus that you want, which is that the PVA won: I've already addressed the Museum and Appleman sources in the NPOV section; the Hastings source notes the accomplishments that both sides could point to (e.g. tactical for the UNC, strategic for the PVA); I can't access the Pembroke source but from what you've quoted it reads like it's Beijing's and not Pembroke's view of what happened; Sandler is referring to the overall outcome of the Second Phase Campaign and not Chosin specifically; the same applies with Malkasian; and that leaves you with only the Edwards and Cumings sources which says unambiguously that it was a defeat for the US - hardly a "consensus". The only consensus from the sources is that the battle ended in a draw but you refuse to acknowledge this and instead try desperately at every opportunity to represent the consensus as pro-PVA because you are strongly pro-Communist (Party rule)/anti-US, stances which you don't even try to hide as your editing record proves. (E.g. your contributions here and here) You really should stop editing this page/article already because it's clear that you just aren't here to contribute. Wingwraith (talk) 08:17, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
The point of this section was to look at what sources say. Do you have a source that says it was a draw?--Jack Upland (talk) 08:25, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I don't need to because the motivation for your creation of this section is entirely corrupt (as I insinuated in my comment immediately preceding yours). Wingwraith (talk) 08:48, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Unless the allied forces at Chosin were not part of the UNC, both Sandler's and Malkasian's assertions are relevant to this article. Both talk of a UN defeat in the context of the action at Chosin, Sandler by reference to Hungnam, Malkasian explicitly. Factotem (talk) 10:28, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Further to the above:

  • Eric Hammel, Chosin (p 33): "If anything, the defeat that was meted out at Chosin was the defeat of possibly the most professional force of American men-at-arms ever assembled to that time."--Jack Upland (talk) 08:23, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
That is a distortion of what Hammel is saying, which is that Chosin ultimately wasn't a defeat because he and others like him survived the defeat; afterall, it's hard to imagine how a book which contains a contrasting narrative (i.e. your pro-PVA narrative) could contain a foreward that essentially praises the actions of X Corps at Chosin and be entitled Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War. Wingwraith (talk) 08:48, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
You are distorting what he says. He says that it was a "defeat" multiple times.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:52, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
No I am not your (Google-mined) summary distorts both the spirit and letter of what he wrote. Wingwraith (talk) 09:08, 1 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
You accuse me of corruption and distortion, but you don't put forward any quotations to support your point of view. That proves my point.--Jack Upland (talk) 17:07, 11 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]

It seems that none of the editors can read Chinese and use Chinese archival material directly. Based on the telegrams of Mao before and during the battle, it was clear that PVA failed to destroy any UNC units it planned to destroy, including the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments named by Mao. The only objective achieved was to push back UNC, but since UNC would have withdrawn once it discovered that PLA was in NK in substantial numbers (and MacArthur indeed ordered a withdrawal after the discovery), the objective didn't require a battle to achieve. The telegrams are cited in Chinese Wikipedia so I won't repeat them here. In the larger context, Mao wanted to destroy the major UNC forces in the Second Phase Offensive to end the war, and he failed at that. All China's moves can be understood with that in mind: not declaring war, entering NK secretly to hide its strength, set the goal of annihilating the entire UNC forces, etc. --Happyseeu (talk) 07:34, 5 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Present status of the Aftermath section[edit]

The sub-topics in the Aftermath section "Outcome assessment" and "Wider effect of the war." as now written have a lot of problems.

(1) There are four statements in these two subsections that have tags: two "not in citation", one "discuss," and one "citation needed."

(2) There are three appearances of weasel words: two say "sources" and one says "some assessments." Those weasel words need to be eliminated and the origin of the information needs to be identified.

(3) We are told twice that the 9th Chinese Army didn't return to the field until March 1951. One of these repetitive statements needs to be eliminated.

(4) One enthusiastic editor has deleted material that contradicts his bias. For example, he deleted a quote from Mao Zedong congratulating the 9th Chinese army on its victory was inappropriate -- but does not object to a quote from Mao in the sideboard that favors his bias. That's only one example of referenced material from reliable sources that has been deleted or minimized. At the same time General MacArthur's view is cited. If Mao's views are inappropriate, then why are MacArthur's views appropriate?

So, how do we proceed to fix this important article? I would say delete all the questionable, repetitive material as a start -- and undertake a thorough balanced re-draft of these two sections.

The weasely info box which says "See Aftermath" should also have a conclusion. I would propose, as a compromise, "Strategic victory for China. Successful withdrawal by UNC forces." Smallchief (talk)

Given that I had years to read Shu Guang Zhang's book from end to the front, I am pretty sure Shu Guang Zhang's opinion is not stated correctly in the article. Section IV did not mention that Chosin battle alone affected the Chinese outlook on the battle. Jim101 (talk) 00:00, 4 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

BTW, I don't know where to put this below:

Historian Yu Bin, on the other hand, noted that the PVA 9th Army had "became a giant hospital" in the aftermath while failed in its original objective of annihilating the UN forces at Chosin.[1] Jim101 (talk) 01:08, 4 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

"See Aftermath" was proposed as some kind of compromise, but the Aftermath section as it stands seems to be designed to say that the Chinese did not have any kind of victory.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:48, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Ryan, Mark A.; Finkelstein, David M.; McDevitt, Michael A. (2003), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, p. 130, ISBN 0765610876

Use of Yu Bin source[edit]

Source can be previewed at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PsoDGLNmU30C&q=second+campaign#v=snippet&q=second%20campaign&f=false (p. 128 and 130)

With reference to this revert, of the statement "...the Second Campaign was a major victory for the CPV which dealt heavy blows to the UN forces but revealed shortcomings in the battle at Chosin", per Yu Bin, p.130: "But the Second Campaign also revealed more CPV shortcomings. On the eastern front, the 150,000-strong 9th Army Group (20th, 26th and 27th Armies) was not adequately prepared to face the U.S. 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division." This explicitly links the action at Chosin as the "eastern front" of the Second Campaign. Factotem (talk) 11:33, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

As for tagging the statement about the destruction of the 32nd Regiment as dubious, to quote Yu Bin word for word "Although it achieved the single greatest CPV victory of the war when it wiped out the entire 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division..." Factotem (talk) 11:33, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

For the first point, Second Campaign (第二次战役, the entire Chinese effort across Korean Peninsula between November-December 1950) is not the same concept as Second Campaign Eastern Sector (第二次战役东线, Chinese effort at Chosin between November-December 1950). Assigning assessment of "Second Campaign was a major victory for the CPV which dealt heavy blows to the UN forces" solely against the outcome of Battle of Chosin Reservoir is synonymous with telling the reader "Chosin was a major victory for the CPV due to heavy blows to the UN forces on both Chongchon River and Chosin".
Yu Bin's words: "On the whole, the Second Campaign was a major victory for the CPV..." (pp. 128 & 130). Yu Bin specifically uses the term "Second Campaign", without constraining it to either the eastern or western front. Yu Bin explicitly describes the inadequacy of preparations to face the 1st Marines and 7th ID as a shortcoming of the Second Campaign. The statement about the campaign being a major victory does not relate solely to the UN forces at Chosin, but it does include them. Factotem (talk) 14:19, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Section "outcome assessment" is for the article Battle of Chosin Reservoir, not the Second Phase Campaign (Korean War). That is my main problem with quoting Yu Bin's "on the whole" assessment about the entire Second Phase Campaign here. Jim101 (talk) 14:24, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I would not argue against that generally, but in this case Yu Bin is clearly including Chosin when he writes about the Second Campaign. That makes the "on the whole" statement relevant to this article, and any assessment that does not address this statement in some way is an incomplete assessment of the source. Factotem (talk) 17:01, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I still failed to understand why the assessment of the whole Second Phase Campaign is required here base on Yu Bin’s wording, given by default the Chosin is a subset of events under Second Campaign. The flip side of assuming of Yu Bin’s intention is, who can be sure Yu Bin is also NOT talking about Battle of Ch’ongch’on River in his “on the whole” assessment here? The fact that Chinese Second Phase Campaign is a major victory is not the dispute here, the dispute is conflating this assessment as the equivalent of the assessment of outcome of Battle of Chosin is not supported by any sources here. Jim101 (talk) 17:28, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
You said yourself that Second Campaign refers to the entire Chinese effort and made the distinction between eastern and western sectors. Yu Bin also makes this clear when he writes "...the Second Campaign also revealed more CPV shortcomings" and then goes on to discuss the Chinese experience at Chosin. He does not write that the Second Campaign Western Sector was a major victory, he does not say that the Second Campaign was a major victory except for Chosin. He quite specifically says the Second Campaign, which I don't think anyone can dispute includes Chosin. This is why it is relevant to this article. Factotem (talk) 19:12, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I agree that we need good sources that refer to a Chinese victory specifically at Chosin to settle the debate here on WP, and I'm not suggesting that Yu Bin's statement is a smoking gun that settles that debate. I do think, though, that if we're using Yu Bin as a source for the outcome assessment, we need to address every relevant statement in that source. It's obviously not convenient to the 'Chosin-was-not-a-Chinese-victory' point of view, but Yu Bin clearly expresses a Chinese perception of victory that includes (not refers to solely, but includes) Chosin. It may be a flawed victory, it may have cost them unacceptable casualties, it may not have annihilated the numerically inferior UN forces "as originally planned", but it is a clear statement of a perception of victory. I believe it needs to be addressed. Factotem (talk) 19:12, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Perception of victory in Second Campaign? Yes, Yu Bin said that. Perception of victory at Chosin? It definitely is not clearly stated in Yu Bin’s statement. Given that I am not Yu Bin, I will not automatically make the assumption that perception of victory on Second Campaign means it automatically applies to Chosin as well. If I remove my assumption on what Yu Bin meant when he stated Second Campaign is a win, the only part that is clearly stated in his assessment is that Chosin has been cited as a weakness of Chinese performance. Jim101 (talk) 19:55, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Unless you have grounds for excluding Chosin from the Second Campaign, then an assertion of victory in the Second Campaign includes Chosin. And yes, it can be reasonably asserted that when Yu Bin writes "But the Second Campaign also revealed more CPV shortcomings. On the eastern front..." he is clearly including Chosin. Factotem (talk) 20:12, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Given the amount of success Chinese has enjoyed at Ch’ongch’on River and kicked UN forces out of North Korea 3 weeks before Battle of Chosin is concluded, I also have grounds to say that preception of Second Campaign as victory could also mean the loss of Chosin was cancelled out by situations on the other side of Korea. Yu Bin’s statement does not clearly support both of our positions. Jim101 (talk) 20:21, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I don't see anything in the source to support that. Factotem (talk) 20:29, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

We're obviously not going to convince each other. I've posted a request at the MILHIST Project for opinions. Factotem (talk) 20:37, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

There are other Chinese sources which can also be used. Here's a para I had previously put in, but it was subsequently deleted. Why? It's well referenced and gives some balance by adding Chinese views to those of American historians.
"After the battles, the Chairman of the Communist party of China, Mao Zedong congratulated the 9th Chinese army for the Chosin Battle. "You have completed a great strategic task under extremely difficult conditions." Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledged the X Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, but said that "on the whole, the Second Offensive Campaign was a major victory" for the Chinese forces. He said that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory." [214] Another Chinese historian, Shu Guang Zhang, says that after its victories in the Second Offensive Campaign Chinese commanders became over-confident, believing that "we can defeat American armed forces." This would lead to a Chinese invasion of South Korea in 1951 that would fail.[215]"
Smallchief (talk) 22:50, 11 August 2018 (UTC)[reply]


Which unit query (resolved)[edit]

For the second point, the article already stated that "Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the task force was actually understrength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea." While Yu Bin is correct in stating that it is important part of Chinese POV to view the combat actions they took against UN forces at east of Chosin as an important victory, this does not override that fact that 32nd Regiment was NOT wiped out at Chosin. By stating "wiped out the entire 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division" without any context has crossed the threshold from presenting an important Chinese POV to presenting an incorrect fact. Jim101 (talk) 12:48, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I've changed it to read Task Force Faith, and added a note to explain why Yu Bin references a different unit. Fair? Factotem (talk) 14:19, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]
Good enough for me. Jim101 (talk) 14:31, 5 July 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Multiple referencing styles[edit]

Probably as a result of the efforts of diverse editors over the years, this article has multiple referencing styles. I would like to standardize them, if no one objects. In particular, I would alter them to rely on {{sfn}} to link to the references. Will wait about ten days for replies. ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 08:25, 27 August 2021 (UTC)[reply]

  • Done. You can check if I broke anything. ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 12:42, 16 September 2021 (UTC)[reply]
    • Several cites had different page numbers for them, one in the citation and one in an {{rp}} right beside it. I followed the rp templates. In case you need to recover the other pages, all changes were made with the edit summary "different pages given for same cite(s), I followed the rp templates! see TALK" ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 13:16, 16 September 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Duncan is self-published, probably needs to be removed at some point[edit]

In the midst of reformatting the references (finished!), I discovered that Duncan (2013) is self-published. I'm leaving it in for the time being, so someone can find a replacement. But it probably needs to be removed at some point:

  • {{cite book |last=Duncan |first=James Carl |title=Adventures of a Tennessean |date=2013 |publisher=Author House |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TNo8GezPvzUC&q=Battle+of+Chosin+Reservoir+cold+weather&pg=PA145 |isbn=9781481741576 }} ♦ Lingzhi.Random (talk) 12:46, 16 September 2021 (UTC)[reply]

October 2021[edit]

User:49.179.183.11 as with your edits on Hungnam evacuation you are mixing together separate and distinct aspects of the PVA offensive. This page deals with the Battle of Chosin Reservoir only. The entire Request for Nuclear Weapons was a result of the offensive, not this battle. I am fine with you adding these details to the Aftermath section of Second Phase Offensive or UN retreat from North Korea, but they don't belong here. Mztourist (talk) 03:46, 31 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Water Gate Bridge[edit]

While this bridge is somewhere near Funchilin Pass and south of Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, it doesn't seem like the western world has had a name for it. I found mention of this no-name bridge at Marine Corp University's Frozen Chosin US Marines at the Changjin Reservoir PCN 19000410000 (usmcu.edu). See page 98. Any expert here? Supermann (talk) 01:15, 1 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I'd assume that it refers to the Treadway bridge in Funchilin Pass covered in the Breakout section. Mztourist (talk) 02:49, 1 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]
It was called "Water Gate House #1" by 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division in 1st Engineer Battalion - Historical Diary - December 1950, File 1483 because it was not a traditional bridge, but a concrete passage over a water gate blown by PVA. "Treadway bridge" was a later name when steel-treadway bridge M2 was used to bridge the gap. --Happyseeu (talk) 03:00, 5 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

UN nominal strength at 103,520?[edit]

The infobox cites Escaping the Trap to say the nominal strength of UNC is 103,520. I don't have a copy of the book, but preview from Google book shows the number to be 114,313, not 103,520. Can someone verify the number 103,520 is correct? Happyseeu (talk) 22:13, 12 July 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Casualty figures[edit]

The article says the duration of the battle is from November 27– December 13 1950, so casualty figures should cover only that period. However, the article uses the numbers from Montross & Canzona 1992, which covers the period of Oct. 8 - Dec. 24, leading to a higher figure and it diverges more from the numbers from X Corp., which was for Nov. 27 - Dec. 10. I'd adjust the total using the numbers from the Navy (by Field) which covers Nov. 27 - Dec. 11 and are more in line with the period used by X Corp. If someone wants to use the rows in Montross & Canzona 1992 to adjust for the period to include up to Dec. 13, I'm OK with it, too, though it seems more complicated than it's worth IMO. Happyseeu (talk) 18:56, 6 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Tootsie Rolls Saved Troops at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir[edit]

should this be added on how Tootsie Rolls Saved Troops at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir if you want to do some research here is a link -> https://americangimuseum.org/tootsie-rolls-saved-troops-at-the-battle-of-the-chosin-reservoir/ https://tootsie.com/letters-stories/5 2604:3D09:A984:F000:246B:307E:EB7D:22C2 (talk) 17:22, 28 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Trivia. Mztourist (talk) 02:56, 29 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Umm this is wikipedia not fandom. 2604:3D09:A984:F000:246B:307E:EB7D:22C2 (talk) 15:34, 29 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Umm this is wikipedia not fandom 2604:3D09:A984:F000:38F7:22F8:686D:8A66 (talk) 20:16, 30 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Suggestion[edit]

Probably noteworthy to mention in the lead paragraph that the evacuation at Hungnam was the very last time American or South Korean troops would fight in North Korea. And that the US intelligence had failed to notice a quarter of million Chinese advancing only at night and camping camouflaged and marching 100 miles from the border to Chosin Reservoir, and that intelligence mishap was what lead to them effectively ending their control of North Korea. Saturdaysuggestion (talk) 09:52, 13 January 2024 (UTC)[reply]